

Proton Pivots

BITE-SIZE EXERCISE

Expanding on ProtonMail spoof domains

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111.3 billion

Anguilla, Antigua And Barbuda, Aruba, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Bermuda, Bonaire, Saint Eustatius And Saba, Canada, Cayman Islands, Costa Rica, Cuba, Curacao, Dominica, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Greenland, Grenada, Guadeloupe, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Martinique, Mexico, Montserrat, Netherlands Antilles, Nicaragua, Panama, Puerto Rico, Saint Barthelemy, Saint Kitts And Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Martin, Saint Pierre And Miquelon, Saint Vincent And The Grenadines, Sint Maarten, Trinidad And Tobago, Turks And Caicos Islands, United States, United States Minor Outlying Islands, Virgin Islands

Argentina

Bolivia

Brazil

Chile

Colombia

Ecuador

Falkland

Islands

French

Guiana

Guyana

Peru

Paraguay

Suriname

Uruguay

Venezuela

248 million -

Algeria, Angola, Benin, Botswana, Burk Burundi, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Cent Republic, Chad, Comoros, Congo - Bra Congo, The Democratic Republic Of Th D'ivoire, Djibouti, Egypt, Equatorial Gui Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guine Guinea-bissau, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mayotte, Moroco Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, I Rwanda, Saint Helena, Sao Tome And I Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Son Africa, South Sudan, Sudan, Swazilano —17.3 billion

Aland Islands, Albania, Andorra,
Austria, Belarus, Belgium, Bosnia

- 15.8 billion


AGENDA

- Analyze each indicator in <u>ThreatConnect's excellent blog post</u>
- Utilize Zetalytics larger collection of geo-diverse passive DNS
- Find and share more clues:
 - Attribution work
 - Network protection
 - Unrelated groups targeting
 ProtonMail users

Tool suite: ZoneCruncher with Zetalytics Passive DNS

636 mil

American Samoa, Asia Pacific Australia, Cook Islands, Fiji, Fr Polynesia, Guam, Kiribati, Mar Islands, Micronesia, Federates Of, Nauru, New Caledonia, New Zealand, Niue, Norfolk Island, Northern Mariana Islands, Pal Papua New Guinea, Pitcairn, S Solomon Islands, Tokelau, Tor Tuvalu, Vanuatu, Wallis And F Islands



protonmail[.]sh

- Identified as definitely part of the phishing attack targeting BellingCat
- mail[.]protonmail[.]sh/password
- mail[.]protonmail[.]sh/keys forward to mailprotonmail[.]ch/keys


Tool suite: ZoneCruncher with Zetalytics Passive DNS


2019-05-21 mailsec.protonmail.sh

- Zetalytics passive DNS knows of an additional subdomain, observed on one day only
- Speculation: planning phase of attack.
 Later attacker decides to use subdomain "mail" instead of "mailsec"
- Or could have been part of another, so far undiscovered, narrowly focused attack
- Implications of the A record (an IPv4) could easily be mis-interpreted, so we will not broadcast it publicly at this time



MX RECORD PIVOT






Searching in ZoneCruncher for protonmail[.]sh automatically performs multiple pivots, providing you with the results on one pane of glass.

Here we see an unexpected clue, possibly of use in attribution or indicative of a past operation that targeted ProtonMail users.

For just one day at the point of domain registration, mccourt[.]co pointed to protonmail[.]sh for Mail eXchanger aka MX record service. Mail addressed to [user]@mccourt[.]co would PASS THROUGH an inbound SMTP server based on protonmail[.]sh


FASCINATING MX RECORDS CHRONOLOGY: MCCOURT[.]CO



WOW - so the very next day after mccourt[.]co points MX record to mail[.]protonmail[.]sh - it then switches to the REAL protonmail[.]ch MX hosts, gets verified with ProtonMail via TXT records, gets real SPF records and - hey that's handy - a DMARC reporting email address:)

pnjmcco@gmail.com

SPECULATION: setup and testing of MitMX (Man in the Mail eXchanger)



Same pivot techniques work in ZoneCruncher web portal, scripted JSON API or Maltego transforms

MUCH MORE TO BE SEEN FROM ZETALYTICS PASSIVE DNS

2018-11-26	mccourt.co	mail.protonmail.sh 🚢
2018-07-12	www.mccourt.co	209.200.154.51
2018-06-02	mccourt.co	dns1.name-services.com ✓
2018-06-02	mccourt.co	info @ name-services.com
2018-06-02	mccourt.co	209.200.154.51
2018-06-02	mccourt.co	dns2.name-services.com ✓
2018-06-02	mccourt.co	dns4.name-services.com ✓
2018-06-02	mccourt.co	dns3.name-services.com ✓
2018-06-02	mccourt.co	dns5.name-services.com ✓
2018-05-19	mccourt.co	reg-pr-web- suspensionpages-go- co-1680484254.us- east-1.elb.amazonaws.co m
2018-05-19	mccourt.co	pr-co-suspensions.go.co
2018-05-19	mccourt.co	52.5.149.42
2018-05-19	mccourt.co	54.164.250.80
2018-05-17	www.mccourt.co	pr-co-suspensions.go.co
2018-05-17	www.mccourt.co	reg-pr-web- suspensionpages-go- co-1680484254.us- east-1.elb.amazonaws.co m


	2018-04-26	mail.mccourt.co	ghs.googlehosted.com 🏯
	2018-04-14	mccourt.co	alt3.aspmx.l.google.com ♣
	2018-04-14	mccourt.co	alt1.aspmx.l.google.com
	2018-04-14	mccourt.co	alt2.aspmx.l.google.com
	2018-04-14	mccourt.co	alt4.aspmx.l.google.com
	2017-11-25	mccourt.co	ns1.dreamhost.com
	2017-11-25	mccourt.co	hostmaster @ dreamhost.com
	2017-11-25	mccourt.co	aspmx.l.google.com 🚨
	2017-11-25	mccourt.co	64.111.110.185
	2017-11-25	mccourt.co	ns2.dreamhost.com
	2017-01-11	mccourt.co	ns3.dreamhost.com
	2016-08-09	www.mccourt.co	64.111.110.185
	2015-05-29	www.mccourt.co	mccourt.co
	2015-05-29	www.mccourtco	89.145.89.31
	2015-05-13	mccourt _o	mccourt.co
	2015-05-13	mcccurt.co	89.145.89.31
	2015-05-13	r.ccourt.co	ns1.ns-mimas.com
	2015-05-13	mccourt.co	ns2.ns-mimas.com

Trace forward from the oldest records to the current. See evidence of suspensions, likely change of hands and changes of NS, MX, registrars.

Some malicious actors keep the registrant info when acquiring aged domains, to try to keep the reputation of the domain and attribution pointing to hapless original owner.

mailprotonmail[.]ch


- This is a ThreatConnect find, identified as definitely part of the phishing attack targeting BellingCat. mail[.]protonmail[.]sh/keys forward to mailprotonmail[.]ch/keys
- ThreatConnect used DNSDB to pivot on A record 217.182.13[.]249, finding two additional ProtonMail spoof domains:
 - mailprotonmail[.]com
 - protonmail[.]systems



Zetalytics passive DNS concurs:

ZoneCruncher has same 3 domains on same IPv4

ZONECRUNCHER MX RECORD PIVOT BEARS FRUIT AGAIN



Surprised and delighted to see the patterned behavior tell-tale TTP with the ZoneCruncher pivot of "for the domain we are looking at, has any other domain used it in an MX record?"

Quite rare!

SPECULATION: Test domain for the Man in the MX setup. It makes sense - if I were going to do a sophisticated MitMX that of course I would need to run testing to get it working.

"Sarah with an H" possibly the blog of an innocent person who let their domain expire. The attacker group registers the domain but leaves Sarah's blog in place as cover.

SIMILARLY FASCINATING MX RECORDS CHRONOLOGY, SAME TTP

After signs that the domain may have changed hands (registrar / NS / host changes) and a long aging pause... Attacker points MX record for withanh[.]com to the SPOOF domain involved in the recent targeted attack: mailprotonmail[.]ch

THEN points withanh[.]com MX record to the REAL ProtonMail service REAL mail[,]protonmail[.]ch MX hosts, and gets verified with ProtonMail via TXT records.

SPECULATION: setup and testing of MitMX (Man in the Mail eXchanger)


2018-03-27	withanh.com	<pre>@protonmail- verification=e3597a528b2 5e6ea15b14a70618b5bf47 2ddc4da </pre>
2018-03-03	withanh.com	mail.protonmail.ch 🚨
2018-03-02	withanh.com)v=spf1 include:_spf.protonmail.c h mx ~all 🖺
2018-03-02	withanh.com	mailprotonmail.ch 🚨
2017-08-17	withanh.com	69.64.147.10
2017-08-17	www.withanh.com	69.64.147.10
2017-08-16	withanh.com	198.54.117.212
2017-04-10	withanh.com	dns1.registrar- servers.com
2017-04-10	withanh.com	hostmaster @ registrar- servers.com
2016-09-25	withanh.com	dns2.registrar- servers.com
2016-09-25	withanh.com	alt1.aspmx.l.google.com ♣

193.33.61[.]199

 ThreatConnect pivots on an older IP that mailprotonmail[.]com pointed to, finding these additional domains with Proton phish potential:


- protonmail[.]direct
- my.secure-protonmail[.]com
- prtn[.]xyz
- Using DNSDB, that's all TC found on the IP. However TC later used a more labor intensive time-fencing technique with other sources to find the rest on this IP.


Zetalytics passive DNS shows more ProtonMail spoof domains on the IP:




ZONECRUNCHER HAS MANY BUILT IN PIVOTS

It was easy to find likely related Proton and Prtn spoof domains using pivots like these.







The Zetalytics API is another way to query through larger result sets than would fit in a browser. Vouch and/or vetting required.

First Seen	Last Seen	Domain		QName	QType	Туре	Va
2019-06-27	2019-07-29	prtn.app	prtn.app		6	soa_email	you@can-get-no.info
2019-03-21	2019-07-29	prtn.me	prtn.me		6	soa_email	dns@cloudflare.com
2019-03-12	2019-07-29	prtn.email	prtn.email		6	soa_email	you@can-get-no.info
2018-07-08	2019-07-29	prtn.be	prtn.be		6	soa_email	root@ns 01. domains saubillig. de
2016-09-17	2019-07-29	prtn.com	prtn.com		6	soa_email	hostmaster@1and1.com
2019-06-27	2019-07-29	prtn.app	prtn.app		6	soa_server	1-you.njalla.no
2019-03-21	2019-07-29	prtn.me	prtn.me		6	soa_server	andy.ns.cloudflare.com
2018-07-08	2019-07-29	prtn.be	prtn.be		6	soa_server	ns01.domainssaubillig.de


2019-03-17 2019-07-27 prtn.email prtr	n.email	15	mx	mail.protonmail.ch
2019-03-17 2019-07-27 prtn.email prtr	n.email	15	mx	mailsec.protonmail.ch

ENDLESS SUPPLY SPOOFS


We could keep going with additional finds and likely relate some of them to the current narrow-focus attacker infrastructure.

For now we invite you to join in the effort. Learn from the excellent "Caveats" list at the end of ThreatConnect's blog post.

Click on the "Discovery" tab in Zetalytics ZoneCruncher for this view:




Power user subscribers can wildcard.




NEXT STEPS - FOLLOW UPS

- ➤ Get a ZoneCruncher subscription <u>click here</u>
- ➤ Have questions?
- Schedule a screensharing session:
 <u>calendly.com/zetalytics</u>
- ➤ Keep pivoting there's much more to discover about the ProtonMail spoofing infrastructure and the many different actors who will make a go of it.








HIGH RISK THREAT INTEL FEEDS

Zetalytics customers were protected from protonmail[.]sh on June 27th 2019 starting at 17:52:36 UTC.


We use statistical, behavioral, relationship and resource methods to classify high risk and high confidence malicious domains and CIDRs.

Like many of the ProtonMail spoof domains we listed on June 21st 2019 - malicious use cases may be a mystery but blocking is pre-emptive.

If you're protecting journalists, enterprise networks or critical infrastructure, give our feeds a try.







Twitter: @zetalytics.com

EXERCISE COMPLETED

KNOW SOMEONE WHO NEEDS PASSIVE DNS DATA TOOLS, TRAINING, THREAT INTEL?

Send them our way



tml@Zetalytics.com